Financing Structure，Assets Pricing and Moral Hazard: A Survey of Dynamic Financial Contract
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| Title | Financing Structure，Assets Pricing and Moral Hazard: A Survey of Dynamic Financial Contract
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| Author | Zheng Jun, Li Zhongfei and Ding Jie |
| Organization | Guangdong University of Finance and Economics；Sun Yat-sen University |
| Email | zhengjun@gdufe.edu.cn；lnslzf@mail.sysu.edu.cn；djsky@163.com |
| Key Words | Financing Structure; Dynamic Moral Hazard; Contract Design; Assets Pricing |
| Abstract | Debt default, enterprise capital chain rupture and bankruptcy, as well as financial crisis have prompted economists to reflect on the efficiency and risk of financial contract. The traditional general equilibrium theory cannot explain the fundamental cause of such events, so scholars have tried to find the micro-factors that caused the above economic problems from the perspective of contract design, it is generally believed that the moral hazard caused by the asymmetric information is an important factor in triggering such events. Taking the development of contract theory and technology as a logical clue, and the optimal contract design and optimization of financing structure in the asymmetric information finance environment as key research object, combining the inherent relationship between financing structure, asset pricing and moral risk, this paper makes a systematically review of the research methods and results of dynamic financial contract theory, and refines the ideas of constructing the unified theoretical system of research on corporate finance and asset pricing. Based on the theoretical development path, the paper discusses the future development direction of the dynamic financial contract theory, and gives the application prospect of the theory according to the characteristics of China's economic structure. |
| Serial Number | WP1317 |
| Time | 2018-12-19 |
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