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Do Related Transactions Stimulate or Inhibit the Enterprise Innovation?
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TitleDo Related Transactions Stimulate or Inhibit the Enterprise Innovation?  
AuthorLi Zengfu,LiXu and Huang Dongxiao  
OrganizationSchool of Economics and Management, South China Normal University 
Emaillizengfu@126.com;592134489@qq.com;309406371@qq.com 
Key Words Intra group transaction, Enterprise innovation, Knowledge spillover, R&D risk, Agency cost 
AbstractOn the one hand, related transactions are prevailing in Chinese enterprises. On the other hand, lacking of core technology innovation is a vital problem for Chinese enterprises. Consequently, does this phenomenon affects the enterprise's technological innovation? Previous study did not involve this. Analyzing from the theory, we think the related transactions can stimulate the enterprises innovation because of reducing transaction costs and risks and the spillover of knowledge. At the same time, from the angle of management tunneling, the related transactions will inhibit the enterprises innovation by raising the cost of capital and agency costs. Our empirical analysis finds that: (1) the related transactions within the group will inhibit the enterprise technological innovation; (2) further analysis shows that market pricing related transactions can promote technological innovation while the non-market pricing related transactions will inhibit enterprise technological innovation; (3) Both output and input related transactions will inhibit enterprise technological innovation. The research of this paper expands the literature of the related transactions and the enterprise technological innovation. What’s more, this study also explains the reason why Chinese enterprises lack of technological innovation from a new angle. So our study has certain reference value to the national macroscopic policy formulation and the legal supervision.  
Serial NumberWP1286 
Time2018-07-05 
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