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Contract Enforcement, Entry and Product Market Competition
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TitleContract Enforcement, Entry and Product Market Competition  
AuthorLi Junqing,Liu Shuaiguang and Liu Pengfei  
OrganizationNankai University;; 
Key WordsContract Enforcement; Entry; Market Competition  
AbstractOne core part of the supply-side reform is to guide enterprises to enter a new industry in order. The efficiency of contact enforcement will affect the cost of external finance and whether to be a new enterprise, furthermore, to decide the market competition. This paper incorporate the incomplete contract and Cournot competition into a DGE model to explain how the contract enforcement affect entry and competition. Then, we use the data of Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998-2007 to test the theoretical result. Results show that: contract enforcement higher, entry incentive and competition stronger; capital-intensive industry is more sensitive to contract enforcement than labor-intensive and high-tech industry. 
Serial NumberWP1110 
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