Contract Enforcement, Entry and Product Market Competition
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| Title | Contract Enforcement, Entry and Product Market Competition
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| Author | Li Junqing，Liu Shuaiguang and Liu Pengfei |
| Organization | Nankai University |
| Email | leejqdoc@163.com；liushuaiguang@126.com；lpf016@yeah.net |
| Key Words | Contract Enforcement; Entry; Market Competition |
| Abstract | One core part of the supply-side reform is to guide enterprises to enter a new industry in order. The efficiency of contact enforcement will affect the cost of external finance and whether to be a new enterprise, furthermore, to decide the market competition. This paper incorporate the incomplete contract and Cournot competition into a DGE model to explain how the contract enforcement affect entry and competition. Then, we use the data of Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998-2007 to test the theoretical result. Results show that: contract enforcement higher, entry incentive and competition stronger; capital-intensive industry is more sensitive to contract enforcement than labor-intensive and high-tech industry. |
| Serial Number | WP1110 |
| Time | 2016-09-13 |
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