Public House Allocation Mechanisms with Incomplete Information——An Experimental Study Based on Preference Revelation Stra
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| Title | Public House Allocation Mechanisms with Incomplete Information——An Experimental Study Based on Preference Revelation Stra
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| Author | Deng Hongping and Luo Jun |
| Organization | School of Economics and Business Administration, Central China Normal University;；School of Economics and International Trade, Zhejiang |
| Email | denghp@mail.ccnu.edu.cn； |
| Key Words | Matching Mechanism for Public Rental Housing; IIRSD Mechanism; G-S Mechanism; Fair Distribution of Envy Free Index |
| Abstract | G-S mechanism was proved to be matched with a stable performance in resource allocation when the price mechanism cannot fully play its role in society to allocate resources. However, IIRSD mechanism was currently used to match with the public rental housing in China. In this paper, we simulated real matching with public rental housing in laboratory and used Yaohao random sequence to generate the order of priority as people waiting with the incomplete information environment, in order to investigate people strategy in expressing their preferences under the both G-S and IIRSD matching mechanisms. We also analyzed the relationship between the strategic behavior in expressing their preferences and individual rational behavior or risk preferences; computed and tested personal utility and changes in overall welfare; built and introduced a fair distribution of envy free index to measure the fairness of matching consequences, which directly compared the effect of both mechanisms in fair, efficient and non-strategic aspects. This study also been tested the robustness of experimental results by changing the design, the number of group matches and simulating all the possible order of priority. These experimental results show that G-S mechanism can promote not only the subjects to express their true preferences, and also is more fair and efficient design than IIRSD mechanism. |
| Serial Number | WP1044 |
| Time | 2016-03-29 |
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