Home >> Working Paper
Sisyphus Boulder: Social Stability, Social Morality and Decentralized Governance
Read        DownLoad
TitleSisyphus Boulder: Social Stability, Social Morality and Decentralized Governance  
AuthorGui Lin, Yin Zhendong and Nie Huihua  
OrganizationJiangxi University of Finance and Economics; Shandong University; Renmin University of China;; 
Key WordsRent-seeking; Stability Maintenance; Social Morality; Decentralized Governance 
AbstractThis paper establishes a model to discuss the origin of stability maintenance policies and theirs social consequences. Elites’ abuse of power for rent-seeking will cause people's struggle. In order to keep the space of power and maintain social stability at the same time, policy of stability maintenance has become a desirable option. “Nibble effect” of redemption policy can help elites suppress mass protest, and strict stability appraisal system can eliminate “fuse effect” in collective actions of citizens, which ensure the successful implementation of the policy of redemption. Some people can take advantage of nonverifiability of information and “fuse effect” to put pressure on the government to ask for unreasonable profits. So local governments will agree with these requirements under severe pressure from stability assessment, which contribute to the decline of social moral. Implementation of stability maintenance policies will cause the accumulation of social discontent, and society is caught by “stability paradox” which means “the more severe the policies is, the more unstable society is”. It is impossible to maintenance society stability through institutional arrangements of these policies. Through decentralized governance measures, such as rule of law, fiscal decentralization, supervision and social separation of powers, people can regulate the run of power and elimination of social instability basis and ensure the long-term stability of society. 
Serial NumberWP865 
  • Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
  • Copyright Economic Research Journal
  • The uploaded articles by this website express the authors’ views, not necessarily the views of this website.
  • Perennial Legal Counsel: Lu Kang (Chong Guang Law Office)
  • ISSN 0577-9154 CN 11-1081/F Postal Distribution Code 2-25l (Domestic) M16 (Overseas)
  • ICP 10211437 (Beijng)
  • No.2,Yuetan Bei Xiaojie, Xicheng District, Beijing 100836, P. R. China
  • Phone/Fax: (+8610) 68034153