| Abstract | In this paper, we use mixed ownership companies issuing A-share in shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2013 as sample, studying whether different nature of ultimately controller, different industries, different relative profitability will influence the relationship between corporate governance structure、executive compensation and the performance of mixed ownership companies. The study shows that total completion of directors、supervisors and managers, the partial of stocks owned by managers both have a positive impact on business performance, and the magnitude of this effect is more significant in the performance of the best 25% of the performance of the company. However, for the mixed ownership companies ultimately owned by non-state-owned capital, separation of two positions and management performance was significantly negatively correlated, and business performance are more affected by executive compensation and corporate governance structures. but this negative correlation are not significant in the mixed ownership companies ultimately owned by state capital. For capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries, incentive executive competition will help enterprises to increase R&D investment, and ultimately improve business performance. For labor-intensive enterprises, the blind additional R&D investing is invalid. Therefore, the competition structure reform and the mixed ownership reform in state-owned enterprises is necessary. However, such reforms should vary from company to company. |