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The Distance to Government and Interregional Border Effect of Firms Productivity
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TitleThe Distance to Government and Interregional Border Effect of Firms Productivity  
AuthorZhao Yongliang,Yang zihui and Yang Benjian  
OrganizationEcomonic school of Jinan university;b.Lingnan school of Sun-yat Sen university;; 
Key WordsTrinity Mode;Distance; Rent of Location; Institutional Highland 
AbstractIn the city——development zone——towns trinity development model, firm—Market distance, the distance between government and firm and the policy gaps between the location,comprehensive forms the inter-district border effects of firms productivity.By Blinder-Oaxaca sample stratification method,this paper identify the border effect of market rent, relationship rent and policy rent.It finding that:1)the market rent and relationship rent are included in the productivity border effect of city—town(location difference),and the policy rent and relationship rent are inclued in developent zone relate to towns;2) With the institution becoming standardized, firms rely more on rules and have to reduce reliance of relationship rent, at the same time policy rent has attenuated;.3) In this pattern, because distance between each city in inland regions are relatively more distant, it makes the market rent and relationship rent more obtrusive;4) State-owned firms gets more relationship rent than Private firms, and the foreign firms get more policy rent than Domestic firms.Policy implications of this paper is that, first,under the rational distribution and scientific planning,The sound development of the development zone(government coordinated process service and incentives), is not just to create a "policy of depression", but more efficient institutional highland should be created to overcome additional public costs caused by distance in midwest region,second, eliminates the relationship rent gap between private firms and state-owned firms and the policy rent gap between foreign firms and demostic firms. 
Serial NumberWP850 
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