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Does Prisoner's Dilemma Exist?―Based on the perspective of co-opetition behavior
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TitleDoes Prisoner's Dilemma Exist?―Based on the perspective of co-opetition behavior  
AuthorWang Shijun  
OrganizationSchool of Economics, Hangzhou Dianzi University 
Emailwsj922@hdu.edu.cn 
Key Words co-opetition behavior; Prisoner's Dilemma, New insights 
AbstractIn the rational egoism conditions, Adam Smith's theory, Neoclassical economics and Prisoner's Dilemma all Investigate rational behavior of economic man In different frameworks, but the Prisoner's Dilemma lets three economic school opposite. This paper defines the economic context of cooperation, competition and co-opetition behavior based the consumption model of indifference curve under the condition of the law of diminishing marginal returns .Based on model of co-opetition, comparatively analyzes of co-opetition behaviors and competitive behaviors the Adam Smith's theory, new classical economics and Prisoner's Dilemma model, explores the essential difference and reason of opposition in three economic framework of school study. Concluded: Adam Smith theory , New classical economics and Prisoner's Dilemma analyzes rational behavior of individual based on the cooperation-competition framework; Adam Smith theory , New classical economics analyzes rational behavior of individual based on the integration competition and cooperation framework;Prisoner's Dilemma model of Game theory analyzes the rational behavior of individual on the Separation of cooperation and competition framework. Contrast of two kinds of rational results in Prisoner's Dilemma does not negatet the conclusion in Adam Smith's theory and new classical economics. The prisoner's dilemma does not exist. While economists sink into the "prisoner's dilemma", It is due to that we have not clearly defined difference between competition, cooperation and co-opetition behavior in the context of economics. 
Serial NumberWP789 
Time2014-12-30 
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