| Abstract | During the financial crisis, state-owned enterprises obtained a large amount of bank loans. Private enterprises’ financial constraints increased. But private enterprises invested more than state-owned enterprises. A new interpretation by control rights is presented in this article. State-owned enterprise is controlled by the insider instead of the large shareholder, while the large shareholder of private enterprise is also the insider. Based on the panel data from listed companies during the financial crisis, the structural changes of investment behavior is studied by introducing a continuous measure of control right. Hovakimian (2009) firm-level investment cash flow sensitivity is revised based on control rights and structural changes, which is calculated for each company. 44.2% of state-owned enterprises showed large shareholders behavior, which increased investment without financial constraints. 43.1% of private enterprises showed large shareholders behavior, the richer the safer or saving for the winter. 55.8% of state-owned enterprises exhibited insider behavior, reducing investment to worry about financial crisis. 56.9% of private enterprises showed insider behavior, considering it as an excellent opportunity for business expansion and increasing investment. Finally, the managing efficiency of control rights during the financial crisis is further discussed. The largest shareholder reduced their shares of the listed company with insufficient cash flow to get more cash. The private enterprise is more positive in this dynamic adjustment of control rights than the state-owned enterprise. The management efficiency is not high for those companies increasing shares. The higher control rights, the more shares they increased. Those companies will become the first recessing group affected by financial crisis in the real economy |