The Governance Effects of Local Officials in China
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| Title | The Governance Effects of Local Officials in China
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| Author | Pi Jiancai, Yin Jun and Zhou Yu |
| Organization | School of Economics, Nanjing University;School of Economics, Osaka University |
| Email | jiancaipi@hotmail.com；alex6554@gmail.com；zhouyu_0105@163.com |
| Key Words | Central Government; Local Officials; Political Promotion; Position-Related Consumption; Governance Effects |
| Abstract | This paper mainly analyzes the governance effects of local officials in China through constructing tax competition models. We consider two different governance measures of the central government, one is to reduce the intensity of political incentives, and the other is to enhance the strength of anti position-related consumption. We focus on the governance effects of these two measures. When the intensity of political incentives is reduced by the central government, local officials will decrease the provision of development-oriented public goods and increase position-related consumption, but the provision of livelihood-oriented public goods will not be changed. When the strength of anti position-related consumption is enhanced by the central government, local officials will decrease position-related consumption and increase the provision of both development-oriented and livelihood-oriented public goods. When two measures are simultaneously adopted, the governance effects will be offset to some degree, and the eventual outcomes will depend on which effect dominates, however, the provision of livelihood-oriented public goods will be inevitably increased no matter which effect is stronger. We also introduce the environmental pollution into the residents’ objective function, and find that the critical level of marginal pollution plays an important role in determining the governance effects on the residents’ welfare. |
| Serial Number | WP712 |
| Time | 2014-09-22 |
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