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The Foundation of Strategic Interaction: An Alternative Interpretation with Empathy
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TitleThe Foundation of Strategic Interaction: An Alternative Interpretation with Empathy  
AuthorHaoran He,Ye’an Zhou and Zuocong Ying  
OrganizationBeijing Normal University;Renmin University of China 
Emailrendayean@163.com;15201568693@126.com 
Key WordsEmpathy; Role reversal; Information disclosure; Ultimatum game; Experiment 
AbstractObserved behavior commonly deviates from the equilibrium of homoeconomicus models. Using two ultimatum games in sequence, we investigate the impacts of empathy and its degree on decisions in sequential strategic interaction through reversing roles of decision-making across the two games and disclosing information about role reversal prior to decision-making in first game. We find that both role reversal and information disclosure do not affect decisions, showing that natural empathy spontaneously appearing in strategic interaction is throughout enough. Our findings suggest an alternative emotion-based interpretation for the behavioral deviation from the equilibrium of homoeconomicus models. 
Serial NumberWP687 
Time2014-09-04 
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