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Do Political Connections Influence Product Quality Supervision
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TitleDo Political Connections Influence Product Quality Supervision  
AuthorLiu Xiaolu and Li Honglin  
Key WordsPolitical Connection; National Product Quality Supervision and Inspection; Sampling Bias; Local Protectionism 
AbstractThis paper studies the influences of firms’ political connections on China’s quality supervision and inspection by merging data of Chinese national product quality supervision and inspection to the data of Chinese industrial firms. The analysis shows that firms with stronger political connections have lower probability of being sampled and inspected, but influences of political connection on the results of the inspection are not significant. Further study also shows that the sampling bias caused by political connections is strengthened by firm size and firm taxes. This implies that this sampling bias is also influenced by incentives of local protectionism. 
Serial NumberWP680 
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