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The research on the dynamic game for the increments of the cropland expropriation:
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TitleThe research on the dynamic game for the increments of the cropland expropriation:  
AuthorYishan Yang  
OrganizationYishan Yang, School of International Economics and Trade, Shandong University of Finance and Economics;School of History and Culture, Shandong University 
Emailyangyishan2008@yahoo.cn 
Key WordsThe cropland expropriation; The bargaining; Utilitarianism; Equalitarianism 
AbstractThe value of cropland often increases substantially after being changed its use, the government, the company and the farmer struggle for the increments. Many researchers study the efficiency and justice of the increment distribution,this paper continues to study this problem from the visual angle of bargaining theory. If the initial endowment,risk preference and utility function of the company and the farmer are given, we will find and contrast the two equilibrium solutions under the perfect information and the imperfect information, and also analyze their efficiency and social welfare of the distribution of resources. The government can use utilitarianism and equalitarianism to affect the bargaining of the company and farmer, the paper study the dynamic change of the bargaining solutions further. Lastly, I will appraise the existing policies of cropland expropriation,make suggestions for the future policies of cropland expropriation, and point out the deficiency of my paper and the direction we should endeavor to further. 
Serial NumberWP265 
Time2012-06-12 
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