Game Equilibrium, Factor Characteristics, and Institutional Choice——An Inquiry into the Share Tenancy Theory
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| Title | Game Equilibrium, Factor Characteristics, and Institutional Choice——An Inquiry into the Share Tenancy Theory
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| Author | Luo Biliang and He Yiming |
| Organization | South China Agricultural University，College of Economics and Management |
| Email | luobl@scau.edu.cn；hym0509@126.com |
| Key Words | Bargaining; Factor Characteristics; Contractual Choice; Institutional Matching；Share Tenancy Theory |
| Abstract | This paper builds a bargaining game model of share tenancy and proves the Sharecropping is a Pareto optimum contract, which is also the Nash Equilibrium. What’s more, based on the constrain condition of the difference of factor qualities, it explores a new and systemic theoretic paradigm of institutional choice, which means the efficient institutional arrangement should match the dimension of factor quality. It also finds different types of contractual transformation and the dynamic solution of the game. At last, it uses the historical empirical data from Professor Buck’s research about 2866 peasantries in 7 provinces of China in the earlier 20 century to test implication of the theoretic hypothesis. |
| Serial Number | WP134 |
| Time | 2011-10-27 |
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