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Separation of Ownership and Control, Free Entry and Its Welfare Implications
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TitleSeparation of Ownership and Control, Free Entry and Its Welfare Implications  
AuthorMa Jie,Duan Qi and Zhang Weiying  
OrganizationPeking University 
Key WordsSeparation of Ownership and Control; Chamberlin Effect; Cournot Competition; Spatial Competition in Circular City 
AbstractThis paper studies free entry by firms of which ownership and control are separated, and discuss its welfare implications. We use Cournot model to characterize competition in homogeneous goods market, while use spatial competition in circular city to characterize competition in differentiated goods market. We show that if managerial compensations will be included as part of the entry costs, then both excessive entry and insufficient entry may emerge in an equilibrium outcome. 
Serial NumberWP126 
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