| Abstract | The existed literatures expound the phenomenon that most stock options in our country don’t motivate top managers from the theoretical perspectives of “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”. While the two theories above are both based on the listed companies without a controlling shareholder, which is not agreeable with the real practices in our country. The paper expounds the phenomenon from the perspective of the action of large holder, and holds that the large holder needs to briber the top managers when they want to “tunnel” the corporate resources. The stock options is a legitimate “redemption” tool for large holder, thus don’t motivate top managers (“large shareholder redemption approach”). In order to verify the theoretical proposition, the paper is based on stock options of listed companies in our country from 2005 Q2nd to 2009 Q4nd, and tests the follow two hypothesis: (1) the degree of tunneling is negative with motivating degree of stock options; (2) the influence of the control of large holder on the motivating degree is mediated by the degree of tunneling. The paper contrasts the “large shareholder redemption approach” with the “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”, and finds that the large shareholder redemption approach is most suitable for the question of managers’ compensation in our country. The findings show that, in order to motivate top managers by virtue of stock options, We should introduce stock options into the companies without a controlling shareholder, and the companies with a controlling shareholder under the circumstance that some devices has silted up the tunnel by which the large shareholders steal the resources from the listed companies. |