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The System of Political Concentration、mechanism of rent and Virtues of Firm
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TitleThe System of Political Concentration、mechanism of rent and Virtues of Firm  
AuthorXing Zuli and Zhou wen  
OrganizationThe school of Economics of SWUFE 
EmailZhou59201@163.com  
Key Wordspolitical concentration;“hidden property rights”;mechanism of rent;virtues of firm;microeconomic base  
AbstractThis paper introduces the conception of “hidden property rights” and mechanism of rent to construct a microeconomic base for China’s growth in transition economy. The author discovers that “hidden property rights” commonly exist underneath the system of political concentration and lawlessness,and then they apply to the firms in order to realize its values, which change the virtues of the firms. Afterwards the paper exposes the inner logical relations between political concentration and economic performances by the microeconomic firms, presenting a uniform theoretical frame to understand three “abnormal” characteristics in China’s growth.  
Serial NumberWP67 
Time2011-04-26 
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