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Investment-driven land supply
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TitleInvestment-driven land supply  
AuthorZhang Li Wang Xianbin and Xu Xianxiang  
OrganizationLingnan college, Sun Yat-Sen University  
Key Wordspolitical Elite; land finance; land supply; political economic growth  
AbstractChinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before,and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually, local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simultaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that, in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy, local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; we then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese city panel data. This finding means that China's land issues links with factors outside the land market, and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China's land problems.  
Serial NumberWP53 
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