Investment-driven land supply
Read
DownLoad |
| Title | Investment-driven land supply
|
| Author | Zhang Li Wang Xianbin and Xu Xianxiang |
| Organization | Lingnan college, Sun Yat-Sen University |
| Email | Lnsxuxx@mail.sysu.edu.cn |
| Key Words | political Elite; land finance; land supply; political economic growth |
| Abstract | Chinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before，and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually， local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simultaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that， in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy， local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; we then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese city panel data. This finding means that China's land issues links with factors outside the land market， and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China's land problems. |
| Serial Number | WP53 |
| Time | 2011-02-14 |
|