Abstrat:The effectiveness of emission reduction policy lies on the endogenous demands for change in growth pattern and requirement for better environment.Only when economic development moves to the stage at which economic growth becomes productivity-driven,can the policy package aimed to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emission be incentive-compatible with the development motivation of local governments and behavior of enterprises.By estimating the Environment Kuznets Curve,which predicts the turning point of emission from increase to decline,this paper examines the induced need for the Chinese economy to implement emission reduction strategy.The results show that it is not enough to wait for the turning point to come,unless the policy implementation can be further strengthened in order to make incentive compatible among the central and local governments,enterprises,and people.

Abstrat:This paper studied the change in industrial TFP in China from 2000 to 2005 from an evolutionary point of view.It analyzed the respective contributions to industrial TFP growth of technical progress and resource reallocation,employing BHC and shift-share approach with firm-level data.It found that the TFP of surviving firms tops and the TFP of entering firm grows fastest while the TFP of the exiting firms remains lowest and rises slowest.It also found that technical progress of the surviving firms accounts nearly 50% for TFP growth while reallocation of resources mainly due to turnover of firms contributes the other half.On one hand it shows the significance of competition mechanism and investment to the quality of economic growth,on the other hand in the long run it is very important to realize a sustainable domestic industrial development that the incumbents build up the self innovation ability and quicken the pace of technical progress with the weakening potential of institutional reform and the maturing of industry during transition.

Abstrat:We investigate the monetary policy under the assumption that the capital market was open while the exchange rate was fixed.Our purpose is to find whether it is still possible for the economy in this case to keep the effective monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy.For this,we suggest two institutional restrictions.Given the restrictions,we demonstrate that the monetary policy can still be effective.The implication of such an institutional design in exchange rate regime is also discussed with special reference to a small and less developed economy.

Abstrat:This paper analyzes the position of the intergovernmental assignments of public revenue and expenditure responsibility based on regional economic growth perspective.Our analyses suggest that:1total and social expenditure responsibility assignments have significant adverse impacts on economic growth,economic and maintenance expenditure responsibility division have positive impacts on economic growth,while total revenue responsibility divisions effects are implicit,which suggests that the intergovernmental division of public revenue and expenditure responsibility is not better;2the intergovernmental assignments of public revenue and expenditure responsibility have significant threshold effects on regional economic growth,which is mainly depends on economic development stage as well as total and social expenditure responsibility;3the position of total and social expenditure responsibility assignments has become more better since 1994,while the position of economic and maintenance expenditure responsibility assignments has become more unreasonable.

Abstrat:Without asymmetric information or externality,the social planned equilibrium is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium in an infinite horizon framework;however,in a finite horizon model,it can be proved that this equivalence will not held yet.Because of the possibility of dynamic inefficiency,the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal.This paper introduces the transfer of state-owned shares to social security fund in an overlapping generation model to study the optimal transfer of shares.The optimal transfer share of state-owned firms to social security fund can be determined by the replication of the social planned equilibrium with the competition equilibrium.The conclusion is greatly helpful for the operation of Chinas NSSFNational Social Security Fundin the future.

Abstrat:In this paper we investigate how telecommunications infrastructure investment affects economic growth by estimating a structural model with the data set covering 31 provinces and six years from the year 2000 to 2005.We find that the average marginal effect of telecommunications investment is 2.376 percent,which is higher than social infrastructure investment by 6.758 percent,but it takes on a decreasing trend.The empirical study on different regions reveals that there is distinct regional disequilibrium that the investment contribution to productivity in the West is much higher than that in the others,which is opposite to the instinct.Therefore,it is imperative to keep increasing investment in the West,make a structural adaptation in the East and stimulate telecommunications consumption in the Middle.Our study breaks through the previous literature and draws a conclusion opposite to Roller and Waverman2001,which will be helpful for telecommunications investment decision-makers.

Abstrat:Through a model of the flow of capital and population,it is found that without investment control and with the flow of population,policies of reducing the costs of commuting and housing,or favorable policies only for large cities will result in even more excessive concentration,higher cost of commuting and housing.However,the policies may cause false prosperity,that is nominal GDP go up,but a lot of social product is offset by the cost of commuting and housing,the real income and welfare of most people dont change except for land owners.

Abstrat:Based on the multi-regions input-output approach,this paper researches on the spillover effects of the three growth poles,Pearl River Triangle Area,Yangtze River Triangle Area and Pan-Bohai region,on the inland regions of China.The backward linkage shows that about 10.9 percent of the total repercussion effects induced by the final demand of the three growth poles go to inland regions.Among them,the greater part goes to the central regions and a little to Northeast,Northwest and Southwest.Comparing the spillover effects from the three growth poles on inland regions,we find that Yangtze River Triangle Area has the largest effects,then the Pearl River Triangle Area,and Pan-Bohai region has the smallest one.However,Pan-Bohai region has the largest effects on Northeast and on Northwest,and Pearl River Triangle Area has the largest effects on Southwest.The sectorial comparison shows that the top five sectors with the largest spillover effects on inland regions are almost the same.These top five sectors account for about 40 percent of the overall spillover effects of the three growth poles on inland regions.

Abstrat:In this paper,we investigate the impact of foreign direct investmentFDIon productivity of Chinese indigenous firms with a representative sample during 1998—2005.We find foreign presence at county level and region level affects Chinese indigenous firms differently.Our analyses show that head-to-head competition with foreign invested enterprisesFIEs,in domestic market and foreign markets,generally reduces productivity of Chinese indigenous firms.Meanwhile,possible technology and skill spillovers within small geographic scopes increase Chinese indigenous firms productivity.However,whether indigenous firms benefit or suffer from foreign presence depends partially on their ownership:state-owned firms suffer the most from foreign presence,while private firm benefit the most.

Abstrat:Based on the investigation data,this paper,by using the method of Ordered Logistic Regression,analyzes empirically the key factors of the human capital of the entrepreneurs in private enterprises that affect the selection and innovation of the institutions in corporation governance.This paper draws the following conclusions:1the higher of the entrepreneurial human capital,the more likely for their enterprises to adopt modern corporation institutions.2The accumulation of managerial experiences and leadership of the private entrepreneurs is conducive to their selection and innovation of the institutions in corporation governance.3In Chinese private enterprises,the separation of the owners and managers will force the owners to take some measures in property rights to control the managers.4The CPC membership of the founders of private enterprises and the managers is a key factor to the institution selection and innovation in corporation governance.

Abstrat:This paper investigates the share issuing preference conjecture and determinants of capital structure in listed Chinese firms.It provides a method to formally test the share issuing preference and obtained strong evidence that supports the hypothesis.The results indicate that although in general state ownership,legal person ownership and foreign ownership do not have a significant effect on capital structure,a high level of state ownership is associated with a high level of long term debt.These results are inconsistent with the argument in the literature that the high level of state ownership is a cause of the share issuing preference.Additionally,the variablesfirm size,asset tangibility,growth and profitabilitythat are found to be important in developed countries also play a similar role in capital structure decisions in listed Chinese firms.However,they are associated with leverage in ways different from those in other developing counties.

Abstrat:In the paper,we choose the whole body of 280 private listed companies by the end of 2004 as research subjects and distinguish Capitalists-controlledCFBfrom Entrepreneurs-controlledEFB.The results of regression analysis on family occupying of listed companies capital show:capitalist-families incline to conduct tunnel behavior by the means of establishing multi-layer control chain;members of the entrepreneur-families working in listed company is conducive to the formation of collusion,digging tunnel and transferring resources;companies whose controlling shareholders exist in the form of enterprise groups suffer from being emptied more seriously;in family-controlled listed companies,independent directors have not played an effective supervisory role;the equity ratio of general manager and intensity of the tunneling behavior show U-shaped relationship,"the incentive effects of regulation" and "collusion draining effect" existing.We find the more the business is controlled by capitalist,the more possible tunnel behavior is to be cnducted.So we think the listed companies should be classed and supervised separately.

Abstrat:elen and Kariv2004aestablished the Bayesian Learning Model adding a setup with continuous signal and discrete action,which is in allusion to the social learning setting with sequential decision-making under imperfect information.The Bayesian Model,however,cant be used to explain the experiments results well.This paper attempts to study whether sequential individuals behavior under imperfect information accords with the prediction of the Bayesian Model by doing economic experiments.By designing and organizing two kinds of sequential decision-making experiments under imperfect information,we imitate and test the general Bayesian Model.The results show that decision-maker isnt able to calculate his own optimal decision when he can only get the information of his immediate predecessors action.Individuals behavior can be described by normal distribution approximately.The distribution of individuals behavior in different decision-turns doesnt have significant differences,and they are only able to do the Bayesian calculation in one step simply.