Abstract:The role of bank system and frequent occurrence of bank crisis indicate the importance of enhancing bank corporate governance, therefore it is of great practical for us to study on corporate governance of commercial bank under the background of our bank system reform. This paper examines ownership structure, governance mechanism and performance of our local joint-stock banks by analyzing 28 samples of urban banks in Shandong and Henan Province. It is found that our local banks are mostly state-owned and concentrated, but dominant shareholders state-owned nature had no influence on bank performance, while concentrated ownership had clear effect. And their pay of superior managers had distinct negative incentives. We also find that both the ratio of outside directors and bank size had little effect on bank performance, additionally, corporate governance of bank had no difference between the two provinces.

Abstract:This article thinks,essentially, western traditional principal-agent theory is single principal-agent theory. In fact, it is a kind of corporate governance theory built aimed at the listed companies with the main character of diversified equity. Obviously it is not fit for being used as the analysis framework of the governance problem of the listed companies with the main character of the relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity. In term of the actual condition of the listed companies with the main character of relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity, This article puts forward and structures a kind of new analysis framework of listed companys governance problems based on the existing single principal-agent theory——double principal-agent theory. For that matter, the analysis of this article indicates that, for the listed companies with the main character of the relatively concentrated equity or highly concentrated equity, the explaining power of double principal-agent theory is stronger than that of single principal-agent theory. In other words, it is more favorable to reduce the double agency costs of those companies and realize the maximization of all the stockholders interest of the listed companies. This article, finally, suggests and discusses the threads and designs to further perfect the governance of Chinese listed companies based on the double principal-agent theory.

Abstract:The “stickiness" of expense is the asymmetry in different directions of the marginal expense or cost change rate between the activity has increased and decreased. The paper discusses the content of expense stickiness and main theoretical explanations: contract perspective, efficiency perspective and opportunism perspective. With the analysis of accounting data during 1994 to 2001 from 292 Chinese listed companies which IPOs were before the end of 1995, we conclude: 1 there was expense stickiness in Chinese listed companies indeed. When sales increased 1%, expense increased 0.5597%. But when sales decreased 1%, expense only decreased 0.0578%. American listed companies expense change was 0.55% sales increasing and 0.35% sales decreasing. 2 The expense stickiness would converse in the subsequent period, and would fall in the long time window. The consults support the efficient perspective. 3 The variable of “macroeconomic increasing" and the variable of “capital intensive" can not enhance the expense stickiness distinctly, and the consult maybe express the opportunism in managers behavior.

Abstract:The effect of transfer of corporate control on the operating performance has attracted extensive research in both accounting and finance. This paper examines the changes in operating performance before and after the transfer of corporate control using both the change model and the matching model, and we consider the contributions of asset acquisitions to change in operating performance following the transfer of corporate control. The matching model is applicable in examining the change in operating performance, and the change model is more useful in examining the change in shareholders wealth. We find no evidence that the transfer of corporate control affects the operating performance and contributions of asset acquisitions to operating performance have material effect on the empirical results. We find that shareholders wealth significantly decreases following the corporate control transfer when the contributions of asset acquisitions are excluded; otherwise the decrease is not statistically different from zero. Therefore, it is essential to take into account the contributions of asset acquisition to the operating performance when we study the effect of corporate control transfer on the operating performance.

Abstract:Based on the study of evaluation index system and evaluation methods of competitive edge of SMEs in China, and on the data-base founded on questionnaire of 10,000 SMEs in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hubei, Liaoning and Yunnan, this paper makes evaluation and comparative analysis of the competitive edge in exterior environment, capacity for short-term survival, capacity for mid-term growth, potential for long-term development and comprehensive competitive edge of SMEs in midwest & east areas in China, discloses the ultimate mechanism which resulted in the different competitive edge of SMEs in midwest & east areas, and puts forward some countermeasures for promoting the competitive edge of SMEs in different areas.

Abstract:This paper measures, applying DEA, the technical efficiency, the technical progress & Malmquist productivity indexes in 30 provinces in China from 1978 to 2001; It has also testified empirically the relations between the human capital as well as the institution factor, and the productivity, the technical progress together with the productivity growth. Its research values are that it has provided advanced analytical tools & a research platform for Chinese economic researchers. Besides, it has also offered, for related sectors, the data processing base & the policies basis which are near reality & test standing. The major conclusions are as follows. As a whole, TEP is increasing & its main cause lies in the promotion of the technical efficiency; TEP has decreased successively after 1997 as a result of the slow-down of the technical progress; No one can judge, according to the technical progress, that Chinas economy is under long term & sustainable growth; Chinas economy has shown an efficiency convergence before 1992. After 1992, the catch-up effect has faded & the technical progress has become the main cause of the productivity difference in various areas; Shanghai & Guangdong are the major innovators, pushing the margin of the product possibility moving outward, while Shanghai has acquired annually the technical efficiency on the productivity possibility margin; The human capital & the institution factor have influenced greatly TEP, the efficiency promotion & the technical progress.

Abstract:Capital flight is usually regarded to be harmful to economic growth, especially when it is in a large scale and lasts for a long time. Based on various existing estimates of capital flight from China since the recent years, this study finds no significant negative correlation between capital flight and Chinas gross domestic product growth for the period under observation. A plausible explanation to this puzzling result is that the bulk of capital flight from China is in effect a type of transitory that it returns to the home economy after taking a “round trip”. An empirical examination further confirms the close relation between the estimated capital flight and foreign direct investment in China, which is additionally supported by the Granger causality testing.

Abstract:The data of this article comes from the research group who proceeded questionnaires in 15 provinces of China from July 2002 to January 2003. The national social science fund project is named “Study on relationship between human capital investment and employment of city and countryside in China” It estimates different kinds rates of return to China rural human capital by econometric models at the base of analysis data.Relative polices and suggestions are given after discussion the estimated results.

Abstract:This paper, which is based on 419 farmer samples and 28 village samples drawn from three provinces: Shaanxi, Ningxia, Sichuan in West China, focuses on how the farmers endowments influence the adopting decision on agricultural technology. We revise the popular “adoption condition" and introduce a function of opportunity cost into the farmer decision model to fulfill the above object, in which the new variety technology of wheat and the protection mode in vegetable or fruit planting is concerned. The analysis shows that it is not only the threshold but also the opportunity cost that affects the probability of a farmers adopting new technology, and, accordingly, the mode of agricultural technology diffusion practiced nowadays should be adjusted.

Abstract:Using recent survey data of Chinese rural households, we have attempted to analyze the borrowing behavior of rural households, and estimate the impact of credit on rural household welfare. Results reveal that education, land scale, non-agrarian income, village status, the characteristics of the competitors in the same village, and the average price of some kinds of agricultural products have statistically significant impact on the amount of borrowing of rural households, and the credit also has statistically significant impact on the net-income and the welfare of rural households, especially poor rural households.

Abstract:Risk from information asymmetry faced investors involved around uncertainty of project return and the special capacity of assets management agents. The authors focus on lemon effects resulted from the uncertainty, the promotion of efficiency from introduction of certification agents and, the efficiency outcome rooted in various market structure faced certification agents, which conclude that certification agents in competitive market will be more effective to erase information asymmetry.

Abstract:This paper outlines the relating characters of institutional system as 1separability,non-separability and quasi-separability,2Pareto or non-Pareto character of evolution,3the correct or wrong cognizance,and analyses the relating characters influence to evolutive means and performance.First,if institutional system has Pareto character of evolution and no lapsus cognizance, separable institutional system will be noncorrelation of evolutive time series;If non-separable institutional system is the strong coupling s relationship,it must paractise the overall simultaneous evolution,just evolution by sudden changing,else it can paractise the overall diachronic evolution,just evolution by degrees.Second,the probability of the non-Pareto character of institutional system making evolution successful depends on the evolutive means and the comparative power between the colony alliance with supporting evolution and with opposing evolution.Thrid,there are two lapsus cognizances:the lapsus cognizance to Pareto or non-pareto character of institutional evolution and to the relating characters.The former relates to the aim mode s choice of institutional systemic evolution,the latter not only relates to it,but also the means and processs choice of evolution.Both influence the performance of institutional systemic evolution at the same time.