Abstract:This paper elaborates the impact of public investment on the dynamics of private capital formation in underdeveloped economies. The key feature of the analysis is that the public good is treated as a durable capital good, subject to congestion and risk. In the optimizing market-clearing economy, in which government invest risk loss is absent, the agents are stimulated to enhancing its private capital in order to employ more congested public capital in production due to scarcity of both public and private capital. This negative externality leads to an abnormally high growth rate of the economy, excess private investment and over congestion of public capital. On the contrast, in the optimizing centralized economy taxes are collected to make up the government investment risk losses. In the presence of public investment risk, a tradeoff between the risk and the productive benefits of the public capital avoids the negative externality so that the economy acquires a sustainable growth rate. Great importance should be attached to the supply effect of fiscal policy in the developing China. It is desirable to maintain high public capital expenditure in the economic ante-takeoff period, but the fiscal policy should be adapted to attack the aggravating latent public debt resulting from the public capital accumulation policy.

Abstract:This paper explains why economic growth has not brought about revealed employment growth. First, anti-cycle macroeconomic policies are incapable of solving natural unemployment, which dominates the overall unemployment in China. Second, the investments driven by expansive macroeconomic policies since 1998 have overwhelmingly concentrated in low employment sectors. Therefore, the policy efforts should be made to improve labor market, strengthen occupational training system, and promote high employment sectors.

Abstract:This paper develops a property rights framework for the analysis of inefficient investment expansion in China. It argues that the ambiguity of land transfer rights and incompleteness of banks property rights have profound impact on the behavior of investment. Pursuing their political promotion, local government officials have incentive to encourage investment by transferring land to firms at the cost lower than market price. Because of the incompleteness of property rights constraint, the banks also intend to provide finance support for such investment without paying enough attention to the possibility of NPLs. These factors considerably lower the private investment cost for rational investors without accounting for the high social costs, which result in an over expansion of investment. Consequently, over investments lead to over capacity, which lead to deflation.

Abstract:With the development of fictitious economy and the instability of money demand, the velocity of money is not a constant any more. So we first build a new formula of money velocity on the base of the changed economic environment, and then advance “dichotomy” about the velocity of money according to the flow of money circulation model. After having analyzed the facts in China from 1993 to 2003, we find that the relationship between fictitious economy and real economy has not been in harmony since 2000. The reason is that the great fluctuation of fund in fictitious economy. At last we design long and short indexes to supervise the flow of fund on the base of the new formula of money velocity.

Abstract:The paper analyzes main hypotheses aiming to explain the dynamics of regional disparities in China during the 1952—2002 period and constructs its own hypotheses based on the stylized facts. It uses data on economic development in the Chinese provinces to investigate the competing and/or complementary hypotheses. The findings reveal that the over-regulation in labor market, as well as industry structure, urban-rural inequality, etc. play important roles in the regional income growth and convergence.

Abstract:The paper pointed out the difficulty of calculating Chinas Gini coefficient because the income distribution data in the “China Statistics Yearbook”is given separately under the title of “Urban” and “rural”. The paper got a concise formula for calculating Gini coefficient: Gini Coefficient equals the difference between the income percentage of the highest income group and the income percentage of the lowest income group in the quinquepartite income. The paper proved with strict mathematics that the best theoretical value of Gini coefficient is 0.3333,or a third. The paper calculated Gini coefficient of 32 countries by using the concise formula and the data published by the World Bank. A comparison between the calculated Gini coefficients and the published Gini coefficients by the World Bank shows that the results are very close to each other. The analysis of the best theoretical value and the concise calculation formula of Gini coefficient in the paper provided a simple and quick way to calculate Gini coefficient of China as a whole.

Abstract:We study the fringe entry behaviors under the regulation of price and entry, and give an industries organization economics and form behaviors interpretation about the deregulation. We found that, with the progresses of technologies and the improvement of demand structure, the fringe entry behavior was the result of the product differences, organization structure and the power arrangement. From these views, the deregulation follows the fringe entry becomes the optimal choice for the society welfare improving.

Abstract:The paper studies the effects of the investment climate IC on the performance of Foreign Invested Enterprises FIEs using firm-level data in 44 cities in China. We find that IC has significant and positive effects on the performance of FIEs. We also find that FIEs that have operated longer in China, or whose foreign investors have had more investments in China rely less on IC. The change in the performance in the data may reflect an actual change in the profit or a change in the amount of tax-driven under-reporting of the profit. Our empirical results support the former view, while only partially support the latter view.

Abstract:This paper studied the protection of minority investors in the different stages. We found that the initial returns of IPOs in the different periods of law protection were significantly different from each other, which indicated that market protection requirement of minority investors declined with the development of law protection. In the period with better law protection of minority investors, they relied less on market protection and required lower initial return of IPOs, while they resorted to market protection first in poor law protection stage. With the improvement of law protection of minority investors, they relieved their market dependence accordingly. Our test showed that the initial returns of IPOs reduced when law protection went to a better stage from the initial stage. And this study supported the main ideas of La Porta et al. from a very different viewpoint.

Abstract:This paper analyzes the influence of administrations corruption and the adjustment cost which is caused by administrations corruption. Through the models analysis we get the conclusion that when the marginal production efficiency of public expenditure is high and the tax rate is low, the administrations corruptions negative influence towards economic growth will predominate. Through positive analysis we get the following conclusions. Firstly, administrations corruption decreases economy growth rate. Secondly, administrations corruption wastes lots of public total expenditure.The relation between administrations corruption and public expenditure is positive. Thirdly, in the process of economic development of our country,there exists a large quantity of the outbudgets expenditure. Whats more, outbudgets expenditure is controlled by local government or local governments civil servants. Therefore, the adjustment cost of public expenditure increases. This demonstrates that outbudgets expenditure hindered economic growth in the whole.

Abstract:The nomination process is an important part of village leadership elections; different nomination processes have different effects on both village leaders behavior and the quality of services provided. Investment in land is a common economic behavior in villages, and according to villagers land related activities are of great importance; village leaders land allocation decisions have a great impact on villager decision making in an election. In researching village democratic elections and the land management system, exploring the nomination process is a new research angle to analyze at the establishment of democracy in village governance.

Abstract:The paper presents the first set of generational accounts for china and analyze pension reform in China from the view of generational accounting. Taking into account special situation in China, we extend the standard method in follow ways: firstly, not only do we distinguish male and female, but also urban and rural cohorts in each generation. Secondly, we have to consider the change of coverage scale, while doing projection of contribution and benefit of social security. Our findings suggest that there is a serious imbalance between urban and rural people. The generational accounts will become negative at age 50 and older for urban people. But for rural people the age is 85 and older. Our findings also show unless policy toward existing generations is substantially altered, future generations will face an excessively heavy fiscal burden. For reasonable growth and interest rate assumptions, the difference between 2002 newborns and those born after 2002 ranges from 66 to 102 percent. If we adopt retirement age extension plan, the situation will be improved greatly. The generational imbalance will decrease to 43 to 81 percent. If we dont reform the pension system of institutions and state organs, the generational imbalance will increase to 78 to 115 percent.