Abstract:The arguments put forward in the paper include: 1. Banking reforms under the motivation of governments are usually the result of external stimulus and pursuit of short-term effect. 2. With the micro-level in the economy remaining unchanged, the readjustment of equity structure in our state-owned banks SOBs will be doomed to failure. 3. The existence of national banking system on a worldwide basis and its efficient operation indicate that the practice to promote the efficiency of the banking system in China through artificially decreasing the ratio of SOBs is logically misguided. 4. The reason for the low efficiency of SOBs lies with their particular ways to be rewarded rather than with promoters. Therefore the conclusion drawn in the paper is what follows: The problems with our SOBs are actually an eventual reflection of the numerous contradictions and benefit games persistently existing in the reform process and should be dealt with gradually and prudently.

Abstract:After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, avoiding inflation and fluctuation of economic growth has become one of fields in macroeconomic and institutional research in many developed countries and developing countries. Both theory research and empirical study demonstrate that the independence of the central bank and the macroeconomic stability are closely intertwined. So, since 1970s institutional reforms on the independence of the central bank have been widely carried out in many countries. Also a series of institutional reforms have been implemented in Peoples Bank of China PBC from1980s to 1990s. However, until now there has not been any systematic research inquiring into the independence of Peoples Bank of China yet. The purpose of this article is: Firstly, according to the GMTs approach and the CWNs approach to measure the legal indices of PBC independence, then use the vertical and transnational comparisons of independence indices to analyze the changes and the level of the independence of PBC. Secondly, to construct the policy reaction function of PBC, and use it to analyze the real independence of PBC according to the changes of policy instrument variables and political dummy variables in the policy reaction function.

Abstract:Since latter half of the 1990s, the phenomenon of “overplus” money supply and macroeconomic situation have occurred some new characteristics in China. Using development economics methods, this paper studies the problem of “missing money”, and analyses the relationship of economic growth, money supply and inflation in this period. We find that two sector economy structure cause the “structural constraints” and “demand constraints”, hindering economic development. We think that the new characteristics of “Chinese Riddle” and “missing money” stem from the internal change of macroeconomic mechanism.

Abstract:Previous studies focused on the effects of Chinas administrative decentralization and fiscal contracting on local economic development and the interactions across regions. This paper builds a simple model of political tournament between local officials and explores the effect of promotion incentives of local officials on the competition and cooperation between regions. Since political tournaments are characterized by the direct conflict of interests between participants, namely one officials promotion implying its competitors total failure, local officials under tournaments have little room for cooperation but much room for competition. This simple model contributes to enhancing our understanding of the causes underlying Chinas prolonged local protectionism, duplicative investments, and excessive industrial competition among regions.

Abstract:Two aspects must be taken note of while studying the problems of government educational expenditure territorial imbalance:government finance and the long-term educational policy.In this article,the relationship between government educational expenditure growth and the educational demand was discussed Base on the statistical data, a dynamic model was established to analysis the changed process of the levels of the educated population by different provinces government educational expenditure.Result showed that government should adjust the long-term educational policy between the developed areas and strengthen the shift payment of finance.At the same time,the government must use the limited educational funds to the education area by optimize the structure and rise efficiency of the government educational expenditure.

Abstract:The analysis based on the provincial panel data during 1987—2001 shows that urbanization significantly decreases the statistical urban-rural inequality. We also find that inter-provincial migration, economic opening, denationalization, and governmental participation in the economic activities tend to enlarge the urban-rural inequality. The structure of local governmental expenditure is also found to have significant effects on urban-rural inequality. This study suggests that the enlarging urban-rural inequality is due to local governmental economic policies that are somewhat urban-biased.

Abstract:In China, since the status of the Organic Law of villagers Committee was made permanent in 1998, each village is demanded by the law to openly elect its own head to manage its own various affairs. However, the central government assigns a lot of non-funded mandates through a lot of regulations to local level governments and must rely on the latter to implement them. So local level governments can find good excuses to under-supply grass-roots democracy and even seek their self-interests in the name of implementing the regulation tasks of the central government. Because of the problem of information asymmetry between central government and local government, the local-level governments can levy taxes & fees higher than the level that is necessary to offset the implementation costs of regulations. Moreover, in order to enforce the regulations smoothly, the central government will to some extent permit some of the non-democratic behaviors of local government. In such case there exists the phenomenon of legal-soft-constraint.

Abstract:Traditional water right trading between different users may bring third-party effects as reducing the instream flow of the intermediate stream and downstream. A set of simple trading rules of water market is designed to avoid third-party effects. The initial water right is distributed to meet the minimum instream flow standard which the authority sets exogenously, and the trading ratios are set by the authority too. The trading ratios are set exogenously based on return flow parameters to ensure that any trading would not violate minimum instream flow standards and consequently to reduce the transation costs. This paper shows that the trading rules can take care of the location effects of users and can achieve social optimal when only local return flows occurs. While in the case of cross-zonal return flows, the trading may not bring the optimal outcome which dues to the minimum instream flow standard which is used to avoid third-party effects.

Abstract:Using the Panel Data of housing prices and economic fundamentals of 14 cities for 1995—2002, with the Pooled Least Squares and Dummy Variable Regression Model, this paper investigates the city-level interactions of housing prices and economic fundamentals in China. It reveals that, during all the period, past and current information of economic fundamentals could partially explain the level or percentage change rate of housing prices and the city-level housing market in China is not in accordance with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Special effects of cities do exist in the reduced form composed by the level of the variables, and special effects of years are significant in 1998 and later on, especially for 2001—2002. The growth of housing prices could not be well explained by past information of economic fundaments and housing prices in recent years which may need the policy makers and practitioners pay enough attention to.

Abstract:This paper gathers domestic and foreign literatures on graduates employment on the basis of which it examines the problems associated with graduates job seeking in China from the point of view of the evolution of the system of graduates employment, the change of supply and demand in graduates employment market, personal employment intention and behavior, the expectation of employers to graduates employment and policies of graduates employment overseas, through the use of questionnaire survey, statistical analysis and deep interview. The paper suggests that although there are some difficulties associated with graduates job seeking, the difficulties are magnified because of the limitation in designing the indicators of graduates employment, such as first employment rate.At the end of this paper, some policy implications are put forward on how to alleviate difficulties of graduates employment in labor market, especially on how to decrease structural unemployment.

Abstract:This paper studies 40 M & A events happened between listed companies in China during 1998 to the first half year of 2002. Some exploring studies have been done to find the characteristic of the match between the acquiring firms and the target firms which improves both their performance through M&A, and also to find the potential resources for the performance improvement. Empirical results show that the acquiring firms performance decreased significantly and the target firms performance improved without statistical significance. In general the performance of the M&A firms decreased significantly one year after M&A happening; the acquiring which improving their performance have a manifest advantage in earning power, growth competence, managerial competence. While the targeting only have the advantage in tax; The match of the acquiring and the targeting, which improving both their performance, has the manifest characteristic of “the strong matching the weak”; The factors which improving the performance of the acquiring may be the preferential policy, which the resources for the targeting may be the improvement of managerial competence, the enhancement of market power and the synergetic effect etc.

Abstract:In this paper, the authors examine and compare three asset pricing models—CAPM、Three-factor Model and Characteristic Model, by sampling A-share listed firms from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period from February 1995 to June 2002. The empirical results show that: 1 there exists significant “Book-to-Market Effect” and “SIZE Effect”, but no “January Effect” for the small firms; 2 the three-factor model is able to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns better than CAPM; 3 the results reject the irrational asset pricing model——the Characteristic Model, but support the rational asset pricing model——Three-factor Model, it is the risk factor rather than the characteristic determining the cross-section of stock returns in China. These findings show BM and SIZE stand for risk factors, rather than characteristics, so the cross-sectional variation in stock returns is determined by risk factors, rather than characteristics. The authors suggest that the results above can be explained by a long-run co-moving trend of all stocks in China.

Abstract:How to describe the investors behavior is the main clue of asset pricing theory in these 50 years. The behavior asset pricing theory are proposed by modifying the utility function in CCAPM model, explores the investors behavior thoroughly. This paper constructs a general equilibrium framework for behavior asset pricing models, studies the differences between the framework and behavior finance, and uses the framework to summarize some behavior asset pricing models. At last, this paper analyzes the direction of behavior asset-pricing models.