Abstract:The paper utilizes several common used definitions in poverty measurement and establishes their relationships and applications to develop a model for poverty analysis. The paper further develops the methodology of decomposition of growth effect and proposes a poverty reduction index. The model was applied to the survey and other official data to analyze the rural poverty reduction in the PRC from 1985 to 2001. The empirical results produced by the model are consistent with the PRCs poverty reduction experience since 1985. The poverty reduction index implies that the selection of growth policies should be to maximize the sum of income and inequality effect. This offers the choices of growth policies for different development stages and different regions.

Abstract:Owing to ignoring moral cost, the existing papers on corruption didnt give a satisfactory explanation to the practical problem. In this paper, we construct a model to explain why corruption can be rampant. Besides, on the basis of the successful and the failing experience, we give corresponding suggestion to prevent corruption. we put forward that individual morality and behavior will interact in the society. Based on this idea, we can construct a dynamic model to explain how morality affects malversation. The most important conclusion we draw is that there exists a corrupt trap. So, in order to prevent corruption effectively, the traditional method is not enough. What is the most important is to build a credit mechanism which includes beforehand supervise and encouraging disclosure.

Abstract:This paper proposes a CAPM based on risky fund,which describes the linear relation between the assets return and risk.In the new model,the risk is defined as the covariance of return on the asset and return on the risky fund,divided by the variance of the return on the risky fund.The CAPM based on risky fund is used to prove the famous CCAPM.

Abstract:The paper empirically investigates the patterns and impact of banking regulation on overall financial development in 118 countries around the world.Based on four dimensions, we identify three major different patterns of banking regulation around the world: 1 the India-China type featured by dominant government ownership; 2 the South Africa-Philippines-Mexico type characterized by dominant use of government direct regulation, and 3 the Germany-US-Switzerland-France type characterized by dominant use of government empowerment. Regressions show that the level of overall financial development is negatively correlated with the extent of government ownership and some specific measures of direct regulations of banks.In promoting overall financial development, the Germany-US-Switzerland-France type is the most preferable, and the South Africa-Philippines-Mexico one lies in between, while the India-China one is the least preferable.Policy suggestions from our findings are: 1 developing private banks; 2 maintaining the independence of regulatory agencies; 3 reducing government direct regulation; and 4 introducing the explicit deposit insurance scheme.

Abstract:Based on the fact that the researches on transaction costs are usually focused on the process whose core spirits are property rights while the analyses of transactions induced by macro-regulation are ignored, this article thinks that a new institutional analysis should involve in policy transaction thoughts, that is, governments macro-regulation will lead to transaction costs of investment choice. According to the fact whether the investor will pay for the transaction costs induced by policy during the investment process and how much he will pay, the article divides the investors final positions of a certain period into three different groups. Based on the corresponding basic equilibrium equations, the article gives out an indirect game explanation to the investors investment choice while using transaction costs category analysis. The analysis of this article makes clear in some degrees the reasons why the actual investments tend to depart from macro-regulation.

Abstract:Securities industry is a high-risk industry, prevention and control of risk is the permanent topic of securities firms and financial regulators. With the rapid development of Chinese securities market, risk monitor and control has become a long-term important task for securities firms. Currently, China is in the transitional period, what kinds of risks are securities firms confronted Why do these risks come into being How can we improve the control efficiency under the practical restraints In order to answer these questions, first this paper analyzes the risks and their reasons of Chinese securities firms, so as to find corresponding measures. Then we discuss the relationship between internal and external risk control from a theoretical perspective, followed by the practical restraints imposed on strengthening risk control. Finally, this paper concludes with a basic framework of coordination and balance between internal and external risk control.

Abstract:This paper attempts to find out corporate governance of High-Tech firms. Using a model of the optimal structure of corporate governance, this paper estimates the Principal-Agent problem in High-Tech firms. This paper shows: as the discontinuous distribution of output“0—1” Distribution, the optimal structure of corporate governance of High-Tech firms is “Endogenous destabilization”. To improve the efficiency of High-Tech firms, the micro and macro redeem-system is necessary.

Abstract:This paper analyzes the solution to Nashs bargaining problem. There are many solutions in literature. Previous study discusses the existence and uniqueness of the solution, but they impose assumptions that cant be verified to the solution directly or to agents preference. We follow Nashs model but without these assumptions that cannot be verified. Using method like "focal point" methods in Game theory, we can get the following conclusions: many solutions can exist in reality, the different solutions to different problems are decided by the social convention; the value of the solution and its change interact with the social convention. We also provide an example that can be analyzed by the model: reward-offering advertisement.