Abstract:An analysis frame of institutional change of China in an evolutionary perspective is advanced,which is based on Hayeks theory about the evolution of the order of society.It is shown that there are two evolutionary paths of the order of society during Chinas economic transition,one is that cosmos has been chosen by government,and the other is that taxis has been chosen by the public.The institutions and rules in China have been evolved from the contradiction and coordination between taxis and cosmos,and the evolution of taxis plays a more and more important role in the transition.In fact the central government acts as a judge,and local governments carry out institutional innovations as entrepreneurs.The essence of the institutional change in China is that the role of cosmos has been gradually weakened,and the role of taxis has been gradually intensified.

Abstract:This Paper,based on data collected in 800 SOEs in China,estimates non performing debtsNPD and gives an analysis of the causes of NPD in SOEs.The ratio of NPDNPD/Total loans of selected enterprises in 1995 is 22%,which approximates to the estimate made unofficially by research departments under banks.The estimated rate of slacken loans and the rate of dead loans of selected enterprises is 12 7% and 9 3% respectively,which is higher than the 4% and the 2% published officially.The causes for NPD in SOEs analysis demonstrates are different from the popular understanding. 1.The main cause of over heavy burden of liability on SOEs is not lack of direct financial sources.SOEs are more pleased to choose loans from banks than from direct finance sources.This shows SOEs strong preference for bank loans. 2.The high interest rate of the high liability rate is not the primary reasons for losses of SOEs.The high debt rate is the result of SOEs freewill choice at the advantage of getting sufficient loans from banks. 3.SOEs prefer maintaining high debts instead of repaying loans.The ease of the pressure on repayment of enterprises by government and banks and the softening of self restraint on the loan repayment by SOEs relate with deep rooted system problems such as mixed government and enterprise functions,and unclear property rights.

Abstract:A foreign investment is efficient for a nation only if it increases real GNPnot GDP of this nation.By this criterion this paper analyses separately the investment effect,the tax revenue effect and the resource allocation effect of tax preference for foreign funded enterprises.Tax preference for foreign funded enterprises can increase foreingn investment,and this increase in foreign investment can usually raise real GNP of the nation through raising its tax revenue and income of domestic production factors.But tax preference decreases directly the tax revenue of the nation,distorts its resource alloction through making the demand for production factors by the enterprises with foreign investment and the supply of production factors to the enterprises with foreign investment undue,ineffecient large.Both reduce GNP of the nation.On the whole tax preference for foreign funded enterprises will decrease GNP of the nation.

Abstract:Since 1997,the Peoples Bank of China has been undertaking a gradual shift from direct administrative control to indirect market based control in the conduct of monetary policy.The development of the open market operations is one of the most important shifts in this regard.After the adjustment of various mix of the monetary policy tools,the open market operations have now become a major policy tool.Together with other monetary policy tools,the open market operations have laid the foundation of an indirect monetary control system in China.As an important instrument in achieving monetary policy and other macroeconomic management objectives,the conduct of the open market operations reflects the multiple policy intentions of the monetary authorities.This paper reviews the shift of the means of Chinas monetary control and gives a detoilod deseription of the conduct of the open market operations.