空间外部性、最优政府间转移支付与内生经济增长 阅读全文
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Title | Spatial Externalities, Optimal Intergovernmental Transfers and Endogenous Economic Growth
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作者 | 金戈 林燕芳 |
Author | Jin Ge and Lin Yanfang |
作者单位 | 浙江财经大学;复旦大学经济学院 |
Organization | Zhejiang University Of Finance & Economics;FUDAN University |
作者Email | freebluesky2002@126.com;lyfjyo123@163.com |
中文关键词 | 最优政府间转移支付;空间外部性;三阶段博弈 |
Key Words | Optimal Intergovernmental Transfers; Spatial externalities; Three-Stage Game |
内容提要 | 本文构建了一个包含中央政府、地方政府与代表性消费者的三阶段Stackelberg博弈的内生经济增长模型,通过引入地方公共服务的跨区域空间外部性,重点考察了中央对地方的最优转移支付率、地方政府的最优财政政策及相应的最优税收。我们首先探讨了收入税筹资模式下的次优配置,在逆向求解地方政府财政政策函数的基础上,论证了福利最大化与增长最大化的一致性,分析了最优转移支付率和相应的最优中央与地方收入税率及地方政府最优公共支出水平。我们发现,中央最优转移支付率及相应的最优中央收入税率与地方公共服务对相邻地区产出的弹性系数正相关,与地方公共服务对本地区产出的弹性系数负相关。在此基础上,我们还考察了社会第一优配置及其在分散经济中的实现可能性,并将其作为参照系,与收入税筹资下的次优配置进行了比较。 |
Abstract | In this paper we develop an economic growth model with a three-stage Stackelberg game among a central government, two local governments and two representative agents. Considering the pervasive interregional spatial externalities of local public services in reality, we particularly focus on the optimal transfers of the central government and the optimal expenditures of the local governments. Specially, in a decentralized economy with income taxes, we show the consistency of the welfare-maximization and the growth-maximization, and find that the optimal transfer from the central government to a local government is positively correlated with the output elasticity of the local public services to its neighboring region while negatively with that to the region itself. Finally we investigate the first-best allocation and explore its implementation in the decentralized economy. |
文章编号 | WP1180 |
登载时间 | 2017-04-18 |
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