两权分离、代理成本与资金空转——来自2007-2015中国实体上市公司的证据
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| Title | Separation of Ownership, Agency Costs and Funds Idle——Evidence from China’s Listed Firms from 2007-2015
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| 作者 | 文春晖 李思龙 杨金强 罗明 |
| Author | Wen Chunhui ,Li Silong ,Yang Jinqiang and Luo Ming |
| 作者单位 | 湖南农业大学经济学院；上海财经大学 |
| Organization | School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics；Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | wchui0207@163.com；418285129@qq.com；yang.jingqiang@mail.shufe.edu.cn；luoming@189.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 终极控制 两权分离 虚拟经济 代理成本 资金空转 |
| Key Words | separation of ownership; ultimate control; virtual economic; agency costs; funds idle |
| 内容提要 | 本文基于管理者、终极控股股东和中小股东三方博弈框架下分别构建了上市公司管理者决策、控股股东决策以及二者附和决策的投资模型，分析了管理权私利与控制权私利两类代理成本对企业资金空转的机理，进一步探究了经济顺周期与经济逆周期背景下第一类代理成本通过控制权私利对企业资金空转的强化或弱化效应，并利用中国上市公司2007-2015年面板数据进行实证检验。研究结果表明：①管权私利是影响上市公司资金空转的主要因素，而控制权私利对上市公司资金空转影响不明显；②管理权私利对上市公司资金空转通过控股股东两权分离率形成强化或削弱效应：经济顺周期中，资金空转比例与管理者与控股股东代理成本成正比，与公司终极控股股东两权分离率成正比；经济逆周期中，资金空转比例与管理者代理成本成正比，与公司终极控股股东两权分离率成反比。③民营企业、工业企业与东部和中部地区企业相较均更具有更强的炒钱动机。因此，明确上市公司控制关系，加强对上市公司特别是东、中部私营工业企业炒钱行为监管十分必要。本文从微观视角研究了资金空转的机理，拓展了公司金融的研究视域。 |
| Abstract | Based on the tripartite game between managers, the ultimate controlling shareholder and minority shareholders of listed companies, we construct investment decision-making model including managers decision, controlling shareholders decisions and both echoing decisions. We use the model to analyze the influence of two types of agency costs of the management private benefit and private benefit of control on enterprise funds idling. Under the background of economic pro-cycle and counter -cyclical , we discuss strengthen or weaken effect of the first class agency costs on fund idling by private benefit of control , and use the panel data of Chinese listed companies between 2007 and 2015 to make empirical analysis. The empirical results show that: ①Management private benefit is the main cause of listed companies idle funds, and the influence of control private benefit on idle funds of listed companies is not obvious; ② Separation of ownership can strengthen or weaken the effect of management private benefit on idle funds of listed companies: In economic pro-cycle, the proportion of idle funds have positive proportional relation with management agency costs, also positive with separation rate of ownership; In economic counter-cyclical, the proportion of idle funds have positive proportional relation with management agency costs, but negative with separation rate of ownership; ③ Private enterprises ，industrial enterprises and enterprises in the eastern and central china have a stronger motivation for the funds idle compared to others. Therefore, making clear the control relationship of listed companies, and strengthening the regulatory on speculation money acts of listed companies is necessary. In this paper, we study the mechanism of idle funds from microcosmic perspective and expand the horizon of the research on corporate finance. |
| 文章编号 | WP1139 |
| 登载时间 | 2016-12-06 |
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