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转移支付提高了地方政府社会性支出激励吗?
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TitleDo Fiscal Transfers improve the incentives of local governments to increase social spending?  
作者李永友  
AuthorLi Yongyou  
作者单位浙江财经大学 
OrganizationZhejiang University Of Finance & Economics 
作者Emailliyy@zufe.edu.cn,15024458016 
中文关键词转移支付;留成率;收益率;门槛水平 
Key WordsTransfer payment; Retention rate; Benefit rate; Threshold level 
内容提要作为财政分权体制的重要制度安排,转移支付不仅仅是为了弥补不对称分权产生的地方财政缺口,而且也是中央政府治理地方政府,激励其履职尽责的重要机制。面对中国社会性公共品相对短缺的社会现实,转移支付机制能够对地方政府社会性公共品供给行为产生有效激励吗?本文基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析发现,答案是否定的。因为无论是转移支付筹资机制,还是转移支付分配机制,不仅未能对地方政府社会性支出政策产生显著影响,而且也未能对地方政府间支出竞争产生有效协调。更为重要的是,由于转移支付筹资水平和收益水平超过了门槛值,造成留成率较低地区和收益率较高地区地方政府在支出政策上出现支出替代现象,显著降低了这些地区地方政府社会性支出激励。中国转移支付未能对地方政府社会性支出产生有效激励,与中央对地方的支出补助结构没有关系,主要源于中国转移支付机制选择的是纵向转移方式和基于财力需要的支出补助目的。 
AbstractAs an important system of fiscal decentralization, fiscal transfer is not only to compensate for local fiscal gap caused by asymmetric decentralization, and also an important incentive mechanism used by the central government to encourage local governments to take responsibility and diligence. In the face of the relative shortage of social public goods, can fiscal transfer provide effective incentives for local government to provide social public goods? Based on the empirical analysis of China's provincial panel data, this text found that both the financing mechanism and the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfer not only failed in encouraging local governments to increase social spending, but also failed in coordinating the expenditure competition among local governments. Moreover, because the financing level and benefit level of fiscal transfer both exceed the threshold value, resulting in the spending substitution phenomenon in the areas where retention rates are lower or benefit rate is higher, which can significantly reduce the incentive of local governments to increase social spending. The reason that fiscal transfer has not been able to generate effective incentives for local government to increase social spending in China, is mainly due to the way of vertical transfer and the purpose of financial needs chosen by China’s transfer payment mechanism. 
文章编号WP1126 
登载时间2016-11-04 
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