国企高管政治晋升：隐性激励V.S.激励扭曲？——来自我国国有上市公司公益性捐赠的证据
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| Title | Political Promotion of SOE Executives: the Implicit Incentive versus Incentive Distortion
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| 作者 | 郑志刚 阚铄 黄继承 |
| Author | Zheng Zhigang,Kan Shuo and Huang Jicheng |
| 作者单位 | 中国人民大学财政金融学院 |
| Organization | School of Finance, Renmin University of China |
| 作者Email | zhengzhigang@ruc.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 政治晋升 公益性捐赠 董事长在任时间 形象工程 激励扭曲 |
| Key Words | Political Promotion; Charitable Donations; Chairman’s Sitting Time; Vanity Project; Incentive Distortion |
| 内容提要 | 以往一些研究把国企高管的政治晋升理解为薪酬管制背景下的隐性激励手段。本文基于我国国有上市公司公益性捐赠的证据则表明，伴随着董事长在任时间的增长，从而发生职位变更的可能性增大，被董事长实际控制的国企的公益性捐赠会显著增加。但上述公益性捐赠一方面与国企高管政治晋升的自利动机联系在一起，用于保全董事长的职位，为其未来政治晋升赢得时机；另一方面，显著增加的公益性捐赠却未能帮助实现，甚至不利于企业未来绩效的改善。因而，晋升理论上的隐性激励作用在上述国企高管政治晋升体系的实际运行过程中发生了扭曲，使原本作为企业社会责任体现的公益性捐赠蜕化为“形象工程”，并成为我国制度背景下外部分散股东不得不面对的特殊的代理成本。本文从国企高管政治晋升这一新的视角揭示了公益性捐赠背后高管的自利动机，政治晋升的可能性相应成为公益性捐赠新的影响因素。 |
| Abstract | Several recent studies show that the political promotion of the state-owned enterprise (SOEs) executives could play the implicit incentive role under the background of compensation regulation in China. Based on the evidences from the charitable donations of Chinese listed SOEs, this paper demonstrates that the longer the board chairpersons are sitting in their positions, the more charitable donations the SOEs in their charge make. However, the charitable donations are unexpectedly used to make the vanity project in order to hold the position of the chairpersons and make the opportunity for their political promotion in the future at the expense of the performance improvement. It is more typical and serious for the state-owned listed firms whose chairpersons sit in position for long time and wish to be promoted immediately. While the charitable donations, which is supposed to be the realization of social responsibility, turn into the vanity project, the implicit incentive function of political promotion of SOEs’ executives are partly-distorted in practice, and show up as the Chinese institutional background-specific agency costs. We therefore show that there are self-serving motivations behind charitable donations and the possibility of political promotion of the SOE executives is one of determinants of charitable donations. |
| 文章编号 | WP791 |
| 登载时间 | 2015-01-06 |
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