工作论文
当前位置:首页 > 工作论文
经济发展、政府偏袒与公司发展 ——基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题的分析
阅读全文         下载全文
TitleEconomic Growth, Government Partiality and Corporate Performance  
作者侯青川 靳庆鲁 陈明端  
AuthorHou Qingchuan,Jin Qinglu and Chen Mingduan  
作者单位上海财经大学 
OrganizationShanghai University of Finance and Economics 
作者Emailacjql@mail.shufe.edu.cn;hou.qingchuan@mail.shufe.edu.cn;orville_20103@163.co 
中文关键词政府代理问题 公司代理问题 经济发展 公司发展 
Key WordsAgency Problem of State, Agency Problem of Corporate, Economic Growth, Corporate Performance 
内容提要本文基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题,试图在厘清宏观经济环境对微观企业行为影响传导路径的基础上,理解中国经济发展模式的微观基础。本文发现,市场化进程较低时,政府代理问题突出表现为地方政府通过在资源配置中向国有企业倾斜以实现经济粗放型增长,使得国有企业在经济发展过程中以外延型增长为主,具体表现为企业规模的扩张与经济发展之间的相关性更强。市场化进程提高,上述政府代理问题会有所缓解,非国有企业的制度安排更有助于减少公司代理问题,实现企业从外延型增长向内涵型增长转变,具体表现为非国有企业盈利能力提高与经济发展之间的相关性更强。 
Abstract This paper examines the relationship between economic growth and corporate performance from the perspective of the twin agency problems – the agency problem of state and the agency problem of corporate. Based on that, it intends to clarify the micro foundation of China economic development by examining the path through which the macroeconomic environments affect the micro corporate performance. In regions with low marketization, where the extensive economic growth is attached with more importance, local governments have more discretion to allocate economic resources toward SOEs (State-owned Enterprises), and thus the agency problem of state exacerbates. In terms of growth, SOEs tend to focus on scale. Correspondingly, the empirical findings indicate that for SOEs, the relation between sales growth and GDP growth is stronger than that for Non-SOEs. In regions with high marketization, the agency problem of state alleviates, and the organizational infrastructures of Non-SOEs help to mitigate the agency problem of corporate, and thus the corporate puts more weight on intensive growth rather than extensive growth. That is, Non-SOEs tend to focus on earnings. Therefore, the relation between earnings growth and GDP growth is stronger for Non-SOEs than that for SOEs. 
文章编号WP739 
登载时间2014-10-28 
  • 主管单位:中国社会科学院     主办单位:中国社会科学院经济研究所
  • 经济研究杂志社版权所有 未经允许 不得转载     京ICP备10211437号
  • 本网所登载文章仅代表作者观点 不代表本网观点或意见 常年法律顾问:陆康(重光律师事务所)
  • 国际标准刊号 ISSN 0577-9154      国内统一刊号 CN11-1081/F       国内邮发代号 2-251        国外代号 M16
  • 地址:北京市西城区阜外月坛北小街2号   100836
  • 电话/传真:010-68034153
  • 本刊微信公众号:erj_weixin