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为什么政府机构越来越膨胀?——部门利益分化的视角
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TitleWhy Does Government Size Grow?  
作者高楠 梁平汉  
AuthorGao Nan and Liang Pinghan  
作者单位西南财经大学 
OrganizationResearch Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics; 
作者Emailn.aarongao@gmail.com;liangph@swufe.edu.cn 
中文关键词权力平衡 政府规模 利益分化 组织 
Key WordsPower Balance; Government Size; Interest Divergence; Organizations 
内容提要本文从政府内部门利益分化的角度研究了机构精简改革成效不彰、政府机构规模膨胀问题。本文认为,地方领导层中的集体领导与分工和随之而来的领导层间权力平衡需要是导致政府规模居高不下的一个重要原因。本文根据省委常委会组成情况构造了1992——2011年间省级领导层内部门利益分化程度的年度指标。固定效应模型和两阶段最小二乘法的结果均表明,部门利益分化程度显著增加了省级领导职数,并自上而下地导致政府规模的显著扩大。本文分析表明,更大的政府规模是与更大的国有经济规模、更低的社会投资和私人部门投资水平,以及更滞后的市场经济发展水平相联系的。本文还从地方财政收入规模、财政分权、地区开放程度、城镇化水平、企业规模、市场资源配置程度、省委书记相对权力大小等角度进行了稳健性检验,结果表明我们的解释仍然成立。因此,简政放权,约束行政权力是控制政府规模,推行机构改革的必要条件。 
AbstractThis paper investigates the growing government size and previously failed attempts to downsize the government from the perspective of interest divergence within government organization. We think the division of labor and “collective leading” within the local leadership, consequently the need to balance power within leadership, play an important role in maintaining a big government. Using the information about the membership of provincial party stand committees, we construct a measure of interest divergence within provincial leadership during 1992-2011. Both the Fixed-effect model and the instrumental variable model demonstrate that the extent of interest divergence significantly increases the number of provincial leaders, and expands the government top-down. Our analysis shows that a bigger government is associated with larger SOE size, lower social and private sector investment, and stagnated marketization level. Our results are robust even if we take into account the fiscal income, fiscal decentralization, openness, urbanization, firm size, marketization, as well as the power of the party secretaries, etc.. Therefore, we suggest that deregulation and imposing constraints on executives is key to controlling government size and promoting reforms within public sector. 
文章编号WP729 
登载时间2014-10-14 
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