金融危机时期中国上市公司投资行为研究—来自控制权的影响
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| Title | Investment Behavior of Chinese Listed Companies:Impacts from Control Rights
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| 作者 | 张小茜 汪炜 |
| Author | Zhang Xiaoxi and Wang Wei |
| 作者单位 | 浙江大学经济学院 |
| Organization | ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY |
| 作者Email | develop21cn@zju.edu.cn；crpeww@126.com |
| 中文关键词 | 控制权 投资现金流敏感度 金融危机 |
| Key Words | Control Rights; Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity; Financial Crisis |
| 内容提要 | 金融危机期间国有企业获得大量贷款，民营企业融资约束加重，却表现出民营企业投资高于国有企业，本文提出对此解释的一个新角度—控制权。国有企业表面大股东控制实际却是内部人控制，民营企业大股东同时也是内部人。基于金融危机期间上市公司的平衡面板数据，引入控制权的连续测度指标首先考察了投资行为的结构性变化，并基于控制权和结构性变化修正了Hovakimian（2009）的公司层面投资现金流敏感度，分别计算了每个公司的该指标，结果显示：44.2%的国企表现出大股东行为，在无融资约束情况下增加投资，43.1%的民企表现出大股东行为，富则思安或者存钱过冬；55.8%的国企表现出内部人行为，面对金融危机担心投资失败而减少投资，56.9%的民企表现出内部人行为，认为金融危机是企业扩张的绝好机会而增加投资。最后，文章进一步讨论了金融危机期间上市公司控制权管理效率，现金流不足的企业第一大股东出于获取现金的目的进行了减持，民营企业比国有企业对这种控制权动态调整更积极；增持型企业控制权管理效率不高，控制权越高越增持，可能成为实体经济中最先受金融危机影响而衰退的企业。 |
| Abstract | During the financial crisis, state-owned enterprises obtained a large amount of bank loans. Private enterprises’ financial constraints increased. But private enterprises invested more than state-owned enterprises. A new interpretation by control rights is presented in this article. State-owned enterprise is controlled by the insider instead of the large shareholder, while the large shareholder of private enterprise is also the insider. Based on the panel data from listed companies during the financial crisis, the structural changes of investment behavior is studied by introducing a continuous measure of control right. Hovakimian (2009) firm-level investment cash flow sensitivity is revised based on control rights and structural changes, which is calculated for each company. 44.2% of state-owned enterprises showed large shareholders behavior, which increased investment without financial constraints. 43.1% of private enterprises showed large shareholders behavior, the richer the safer or saving for the winter. 55.8% of state-owned enterprises exhibited insider behavior, reducing investment to worry about financial crisis. 56.9% of private enterprises showed insider behavior, considering it as an excellent opportunity for business expansion and increasing investment. Finally, the managing efficiency of control rights during the financial crisis is further discussed. The largest shareholder reduced their shares of the listed company with insufficient cash flow to get more cash. The private enterprise is more positive in this dynamic adjustment of control rights than the state-owned enterprise. The management efficiency is not high for those companies increasing shares. The higher control rights, the more shares they increased. Those companies will become the first recessing group affected by financial crisis in the real economy |
| 文章编号 | WP719 |
| 登载时间 | 2014-09-30 |
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