国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁？
阅读全文
下载全文 |
| Title | Who Is Encouraged by Pay Dispersion in State-owned Enterprises?
|
| 作者 | 黎文靖 胡玉明 |
| Author | Wenjing Li and and Yuming Hu |
| 作者单位 | 暨南大学管理学院 |
| Organization | School of Management, Jinan University |
| 作者Email | tliwenjing@jnu.edu.cn |
| 中文关键词 | 内部薪酬差距 管理层权力 企业业绩 投资效率 全要素生产率 |
| Key Words | Pay Dispersion; Managerial Power; Firm Performance; Investment Efficiency; Total Factor Productivity |
| 内容提要 | 本文利用我国制造行业国有上市公司2003年至2010年的数据，考察了国企高管和职工内部薪酬差距对高管和职工的不同激励效应。结果表明国企内部薪酬差距与企业业绩正相关，并且与企业的日常经营业绩正相关。但内部薪酬差距越大，企业投资越无效率；同时管理层权力与薪酬差距正相关，以上两个证据表明内部薪酬差距可能并不激励高管，内部薪酬差距一定程度上反映了管理层的权力。而薪酬差距越大，企业的全要素生产率越高，并且薪酬差距与全要素生产率的正向关系仅在薪酬差距较低样本中显著。总体而言，本文的经验证据表明国企内部薪酬差距较低时更多地激励了职工，薪酬差距较高时对职工无正向激励效应。在内部薪酬差距可能体现为管理层权力的结果时，对高管的激励效果不明显。 |
| Abstract | Using the sample of state-owned listed firms in manufacturing industry from 2003 to 2010, this study examines the different encouraging effect of pay dispersion on top management and employee. Our results indicate that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance and performance from operation. Further analysis suggests the higher pay dispersion, the less efficient corporate investment. Moreover, managerial power is positively associated with pay dispersion. Taken together, pay dispersion doesn’t motivate top management in SOEs and is the result of managerial power. Pay dispersion is positively linked to firm total factor productivity, and the relation only exists in the subsample of low pay dispersion. Generally speaking, we provide the evidence that pay dispersion is more likely to encourage employee in SOEs when pay dispersion is low, but the relation doesn’t exist when pay dispersion is high. When pay dispersion is determined by managerial power to certain extent, it seldom encourages top management. |
| 文章编号 | WP366 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-09-13 |
|