腐败、市场化与中国政治预算周期
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| Title | Corruption, Marketization and Political Budget Cycle in China
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| 作者 | 高楠 |
| Author | Gao Nan |
| 作者单位 | 西南财经大学经济与管理研究院 |
| Organization | Research Institute of Economics and Management,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
| 作者Email | n.aarongao@gmail.com |
| 中文关键词 | 腐败 市场化指数 晋升激励 政治预算周期 |
| Key Words | Corruption; Marketization; Promotion Incentives; Political Budget Cycle |
| 内容提要 | 本文探讨了在当前官员晋升的锦标赛模式下，政治预算周期现象（Political Budget Cycle，PBC）在我国是否存在的问题。同时，通过建立地方政府官员晋升理论模型，本文分析了政治预算周期是否易受到政府腐败程度和市场化程度的影响，提出了相应的假说，并采用GMM方法对以上假说进行实证检验。本文研究结果表明，我国有明显的政治预算周期现象，换届时进行财政操控的现象十分明显，财政支出和收入在换届年均显著异于非换届年；同时，本文发现腐败程度较低的地区和市场化程度高地区的政治预算周期更加明显，为进一步研究我国政治换届和地方财政周期现象提供了理论模型和实证证据。 |
| Abstract | This paper explores whether there’s Political Budget Cycle (PBC) in China, we set up a theoretical model based on local government promotion tournament to explain if PBC will be affected by corruption level and the degree of marketization, we proposed two hypotheses to illustrate how these two factors might affect PBC. Also, this paper uses GMM to test the hypotheses empirically. What we have found is: China do exists PBC, there’s strong evidence to show that local government manipulate fiscal policy during election, fiscal revenue and expenditure are significantly different from that in non-election year. Besides, we also found the result is in favor of our hypotheses, provinces with higher corruption and marketization will have less magnitude of PBC. This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for further research on PBC in China. |
| 文章编号 | WP365 |
| 登载时间 | 2012-09-13 |
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