对外开放,国进民退与歧视性补贴 阅读全文
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Title | The Expansion of State Economy and Discriminatory Subsidy in an Open Economy
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作者 | 崔凡 邵挺 许庆 |
Author | Cui Fan, Shao Ting and Xu Qing |
作者单位 | 对外经济贸易大学国际经贸学院;国务院发展研究中心市场经济研究所;上海财经大学财经研究所 |
Organization | University of International Business and Economics;Development Research Center of the State Council;Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
作者Email | cuifan@uibe.edu.cn |
中文关键词 | 歧视性补贴 寡头 国进民退 贸易政策 |
Key Words | Discriminatory Subsidy; Oligopoly; State Monopoly; Trade Policy |
内容提要 | 近年来我国对外开放程度不断提高,行业准入壁垒不断下降,与此同时却出现了对“国进民退”问题的争议。本文旨在解释这一看似矛盾的现象。本文首先通过对工业企业数据的描述性统计分析,提出“国进民退”现象虽不是整个工业领域的普遍现象,但却在相当一部分细分行业中客观存在。接着,本文通过一个寡头贸易模型,认为优化静态福利的善意政府,完全有可能在实行对外零关税的开放政策的同时,通过对国有企业的补贴,提高市场集中度,以最大化本国静态福利。文章最后指出,通过歧视性补贴提高国有经济成分的市场占有率,虽然可以提高静态福利,却可能会破坏竞争环境,最终损害动态福利。 |
Abstract | Following China’s commitments made around her entry into the WTO in 2001, China has lowered her tariff rates significantly. However, China's trade partners have been placing more and more complaints on China's practice of subsidization, while Chinese economists have been debating on the expansion of state economy and the diminishing of private sectors. China's subsidy is different from that in other countries in that it is often used as a discriminatory treatment to favor state-owned enterprises against private-owned enterprises. By using a simple model, this paper shows that a government has strong incentives to use a zero tariff rate and a high subsidy rate to foster its favored firm, e.g. a state-owned firm, to a monopolist if the government is allowed to grant discriminatory treatments. The authors also point out that although static welfare may be improved by such a policy, the whole economy may be worse off in the long run due to lack of competition. |
文章编号 | WP131 |
登载时间 | 2011-09-26 |
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